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waste of a kidney, and in money itself. Renal 
transplantation is cheaper only if the patient and graft 
survive more than 18 months. If a patient dies within that 
period, long-term costs would be saved and renal 
transplantation would have been a very expensive form of 
euthanasia. Diabetic patients and patients with 
cardiovascular co-morbidities should be strictly screened. 
This proposal is easy to monitor. The end-points are 
clear-failed kidney and patient's death. Units retain their 
clinical freedom but will have to live with the 
consequences of their judgment and decisions. 
Mandatory audit and publication of efficiency measures, 
such as the ratio of kidneys per working transplant and 
waiting times, provides further incentives to strive for 
excellence. This new approach would reduce the present 
paternalism, and patients, their family doctors, and 
purchasers can make an informed choice. Most 
imponantly, patients will benefit from the improved 
clinical efficacy and efficiency. 
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The politics of grafting cadaver kidneys 
Thomas E Starzl, John J Fung 
Efficient cadaver-kidney use and equity for the walOng 
candidates, described by Mr Chang,l are not always 
compatible. When these objectives collide, which is the 
more imponant? Case selection always has been critical 
for transplantation results, no matter what the organ. 
Halasz,' as Chang notes, enumerated recipient factors in 
addition to sensitisation that can adversely affect kidney-
allograft survival: age, previous transplantation, and 
various specific diseases. One could add: lower 
socioeconomic status, cenain ethnic backgrounds, and 
other demographic factors. A centre whose excellence, 
and thus access to organs, is adjudicated solely on the 
basis of the previous year's results almost cenainly would 
surreptitiously restrict candidacy to an elite low-risk group 
of young, affluent, white, primary kidney recipients free of 
co-morbid conditions. 
Such a policy was common in the USA until recently. 
The allocation of most cadaver organs was determined by 
ad-hoc arrangements between donor agencies and 
transplantation teams, the two groups often being 
"synonymous" in a given area. This situation changed 
with the passage of the 1984 Organ Transplantation Act 
(the Gore Bill), which mandated the development of a 
national system. A task force, chaired by Dr Olga 
Jonasson (Ohio State), was convened to recommend how 
to distribute organs equitably and effectively. After public 
hearings, the group established broad written guidelines.' 
The task force rejected discrimination against recipients 
()n sex, race, national origin, or socioeconomic class. It 
urged caution in giving any weight to such critena as age, 
lifestvle, the presence of a social network, ostensible value 
to SOCiety, or other factors that might only be subjective 
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judgments by the majority population of the wonh of 
minority groups. 
In 1986, a contract was issued by the US government 
to the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), a 
previously private and non-profit organisation, with 
instructions to develop an allocation system that 
incorporated the recommendations of the Jonasson 
committee. Disputes within the organ-distribution 
committee of UNOS prevented such a development. To 
prevent a default of contract, a repon,' at that time 
unpublished, of the cadaver-kidney distribution system 
already in place in Pittsburgh was skeletonised verbatim 
and used to write a single-author contract.) The existence 
of this anicle in press had been made known to UNOS by 
twO of its members who had been referees for the 
manuscript. 
This original "point system" contained many of the 
features recommended by Chang. It was based on three 
principles of which the most imponant operationally was 
regional primacy of organ use; the others were the right of 
the responsible physician to exercise medical judgment in 
any given case (subject to audit and open disclosure), and 
the right of the recipient to choose his or her health-care 
centre and doctor. Candidacy credits were given for time 
waiting, antigen matching, antibody analyses, medical 
urgency, and logistic practicality. Because of the limited 
credit given to matching except when perfect, a kidney 
was not easily catapulted from its procurement area. 
Waiting-time was the most imponam factor in placing a 
cadaver kidney. 
The point svstem was installed nationally in November, 
1987. However, manoeuvering with local and regional 
variances from the original plan and, more imponamly, 
policy changes bv the i~lp Board of Directors 
beginning in 1 q89 soon subordinated all other factors of 
kidney allocation (including credit for time waiting) to 
HLA·matchin!!. This was folly at the highest level. TIle 
institutionalisation ot a predictable bias agamst minoritv 
'panlcularlv black) populations' erupted into a national 
scandal',' when prisoners of the system realised that they 
were waiting in vain. 
The emphasis on tissue matching that wrecked the US 
point-system was the product of lobbying contests 
between the advocates of tissue matching (who for the 
most part managed or supplied the histocompatibility 
laboratories) and the transplant surgeons, who realised 
that tissue matching did not accurately predict outcome 
but lacked the passion for debate. However, even 
proponents of matching have delivered hammer blows to 
its credibility, such as Terasaki et ai's report" that one-
haplotype-matched (parent to offspring or offspring to 
parent) kidney allografts gave no better early or late 
results than kidneys from randomly matched living 
spouses or other non-relatives. When the physiological 
quality of the mismatched unrelated organ was equivalent 
to that of the one-haplotype-identical related kidney, 
there was no matching advantage. The same conclusion 
can be found in the magnificent summary of Folkert 
Belzer's lifetime experience.-
It would be unjust to entirely characterise the tissue 
matching controversy as a "battle over control of the rules 
of organ rationing between the cadres of immunologists 
and clinicians"lo or as an attempt to protect a cottage 
industry of tissue typing.' Yet, how could such a non-
predictive technology as HLA matching be used to dictate 
the allocation of a public resource more precious than 
gold? Perhaps the most important reason was that it was 
inconceivable that a readily measurable, genetically 
controlled, and therefore presumably immutable 
biological system would not predict clinical outcome. 
Kidney-transplant surgeons, tissue t)'Pers, and others who 
wanted to, but could not, see an influence of HLA 
matching in their own practice l !'12 were aware that HLA 
compatibility was a supreme determinant of success with 
bone-marrow transplantation. Why was it not equally 
critical for whole-organ transplantation? 
A way out of the intellectual cui de sac came with 
the discovery that leucocytes migrate perioperatively 
from transplanted whole organs to widely distributed 
recipient tissues where they can be identified many years 
later. IUI Establishment of this linkage between 
haematolymphopoietic chimerism and successful organ 
transplantation allowed correction of the unwarranted 
consensus reached more than a third of a century ago that 
the donor-leucocyte chimerism equated with acquired 
tolerance l ' was irrelevant to successful whole-organ 
transplantation. In turn, it became possible to explain 
previously enigmatic observations. One of these enigmas 
was the failure of HLA matching to be predictive in the 
setting of organ transplantation and another was the rarity 
\If graft-wrsus-host disease after the transplantation of 
immunologically active organs such as the intestme and 
liver lor both together). 
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It had become apparent that organ transplantation 
involved the engagement of mutuallly antagonist but 
ultimately reciprocally attenuated or abrogated host-
versus-graft and graft-versus-host reactions between the 
coexisting donor-leUCOCyte and recipient-leucocyte 
popUlations. Disruption of the recipient arm of the 
interaction by the host cytoablation used to prepare bone-
marrow recipients, but not the recipients of whole organs, 
explains the disparities in the two different kinds of 
transplantation. The cancelling effect of the two 
immunocyte populations under postoperative 
immunosuppression for organ transplantation explains 
the poor prognostic discrimination of HLA matching in 
such cases as well as resistance to graft-versus-host disease 
of the organ recipient. The time had arrived when a 
flawed public policy could be approached with reason, 
not rhetoric. I. 
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